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Abstract
While China’s socialist revolution has been credited with improving the status of women, gender inequality remains. Draw-
ing on macro data, this article provides an overview of gender equality in China, focusing on labor force and political
participation in the past 70 years, particularly since 1978, the onset of socioeconomic reform. Specifically, the article de-
scribes, compares, and examines the progress and challenges that women face in accessing economic opportunities and
political resources. We find a more equal relationship between male and female when resources are relatively adequate,
but that females are disadvantaged when resources are scarce, for example, including representation in more prestigious
occupations, higher income, and political positions. These findings illustrate how inequality is maintained and reproduced,
and suggest that despite China’s progressive socialist agenda, its gender revolution remains ‘stalled.’
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1. Introduction
China’s socialist revolution has remarkably improved
women’s socioeconomic status in absolute terms and rel-
ative tomen—as indexed bywomen’s educational attain-
ment (Li, 2016; Yang & Xie, 2013), life expectancy, labor
force participation (Liu, 2018), and political participation
(All China Women’s Federation [ACWF], 2019)—largely
due to legal and institutional support favorable to gen-
der equality. The gap of education between men and
women is disappearing and women have a higher rate
of college education among the post-1990-born birth co-
hort. Women on average even live four years longer than
men. Over 40% of the total workforce in China consists
of women, which is among the highest in theworld. They
are also encouraged to participate in politics. The pro-
portion of female deputies of the 13th National People’s
Congress (NPC) reached 24.9% in 2018, 12.9 percent-
age points higher than that of the first session in 1954,
for example.
However, studies have also found that there are still
explicit and implicit gaps between men and women in
both the public and private arena, particularly so in the
labor market (Yang, 2019) and political participation (Shi,
2009; Yan, 2018). Moreover, there are strong voices call-
ing women to return home and leave the workplace to
men (Gu, 2013), and discrimination towards women in
public arena has become salient with the extensive mar-
ketization and urbanization (Ji, Wu, Sun, & Guo, 2017). In
a regimewith strong commitment to gender equality, we
may wonder what the institutional and structural imped-
iments to the promotion of gender equality in the public
arena are, and howwomen can break through the bottle-
neck and the glass ceiling in access to better employment
and political positions.
This article responds to these questions from the
perspectives of state power, cultural regulation, and re-
source redistribution, focusing on gender equality in eco-
nomic endowment and political representation in China.
Rather than taking a snapshot perspective and focusing
on a single indicator of gender equality, this article draws
attention to various aspects in the labormarket and polit-
ical participation and compares the performance of men
and women in the past 70 years, particularly since the
onset of the socioeconomic reform in 1978. It first de-
scribes the background of gender relationships in China,
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and then briefly introduces data and methods used in
this analysis; this is followed by a sketch of the achieve-
ments of gender equality and the analysis of challenges
in the workforce. Finally, reflections are offered on the
path and mechanism to break through the bottleneck
and glass ceiling in the workplace.
We select these two areas because they are domains
directly under the control of government in China, es-
pecially political participation. In addition to Chairmen
Mao’s reiterations of the importance of gender equal-
ity, Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Communist
Party of China, stressed that the “pursuit of gender
equality is a great cause….Without women’s liberation
and progress, the liberation and progress of mankind
would not be attainable” (Xi, 2015) in his address at
the “Global Leaders’ Meeting on Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment: A Commitment to Action” in
New York in 2015. So, if the government determines to
promote gender equality then it has the levers to do so,
and we would expect to see the results. This is made
more so by the fact that education attainment is largely
equal, while the one- or two-child policy means that
childcare issues are not as important as they might be
in other countries.
Although literature on gender inequality inside and
outside China is abundant, this work adds to the cur-
rent literature in several ways. First and foremost, the
approach complements existing studies by examining
gender equality in the workplace more comprehensively
with historical lenses. Indeed, some empirical studies
have already explored gender inequality and women’s
performance in the workplace (Maurer-Fazio, Rawski, &
Zhang, 1999; Yang, 2019), but focused on a short pe-
riod of time. Other works (Ji et al., 2017; Wu, 2009)
have reviewed gender inequality since the founding of
New China or market reform, but they focused on the
explanation of gender gaps in the public and private
arena. Complementing existing studies, this work pro-
vides an overview of the evolutionary trajectory of gen-
der dynamics using empirical data covering the past
70 years. Furthermore, it also considers political par-
ticipation, an important indicator of gender relation-
ships largely ignored in relevant research. As the World
Economic Forum (WEF, 2019) report shows, the situation
of gender equality in China worsened in 2019, due to
women’s lower presentation in politics in addition to the
high sex ratio at birth.
2. Context of Gender Equality in China
2.1. Reconfiguration of Institutional Norms
China is well known for its long history of gender in-
equality. Women were dependent on their fathers, hus-
bands and children in different life stages under the tra-
ditional patriarch system, which defined the gender re-
lationships and designated different roles for men and
women in public and private arenas (Yang, 2010). Within
this cultural discourse, there was a clear demarcation
between men and women in the division of labor and
role expectations.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in 1949, however, “times are different, and men
and women are equal” (“Chairman Mao and Chairman
Liu,” 1965). The Communist regime, with its strong com-
mitment to gender equality and state power (Wu, 2009;
Zuo, 2005), vigorously advocated gender equality in
many ways. The political commitment was bolstered
by the Constitution of the PRC, by various laws, public
policies (e.g., the 1988 Regulations on Labor Protection
of Female Employees, the 1992 Law of the PRC on
the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women, the
2008 Employment Promotion Law, and the Law on Land
Contract in Rural Areas, from 2002–2018), and practices
in guaranteeing women’s rights in all aspects and provid-
ing public childcare service to emancipate women from
the household. Article 48 of Constitution of PRC, for ex-
ample, states that:
Women in the People’s Republic of China enjoy equal
rights with men in all spheres of life, in political,
economic, cultural, social and family life. The state
protects the rights and interests of women, applies
the principle of equal pay for equal work to men
and women alike and trains and selects cadres from
among women. (The Central People’s Government of
the PRC, 2005)
The interplay and interaction of political, legal and cul-
tural shifts have all laid down a foundation, from top-
down, for gender equality in the workforce in China.
Consequently, urban and rural women were gradu-
ally liberated from traditional patriarchal systems and
joined theworkforce in the early years of NewChina. The
rise of the service industry in the 1960s further alleviated
discrimination against women in employment. Indeed,
female labor force participation is one of the most im-
portant breakthroughs against thousands of years of tra-
ditional division of labor. ‘Iron girls’ were the representa-
tion of the new types of gender division of labor in the
1960s and 1970s. While the new pattern has a negative
effect on women because it solidifies, rather than chal-
lenges, traditional gender roles (Jiang, 2012; Jin, 2006;
Zuo, 2005), the role of a ‘social person’ definitely helps
women break free and to move towards achieving equal-
ity with men in rights and obligations (Jiang, 2012).
However, we should also acknowledge that since
China’s advocacy and practice of gender equality largely
results from the communist commitment to emancipate
women from feudalist tradition (Li, 1997), the promo-
tion of gender equality may have intrinsic constraints
and simply be the political discourse of the ruling party.
During the first 30 years of New China, gender equality
was supported by both an equal gender ideology and
grass-root practice, but in the subsequent 40 years, the
dominant position of the government in the gender dis-
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course has given way to the market. However, the mar-
ket, for the purpose of making money, allied with the tra-
ditional gendered culture that highlights male superior-
ity, has changed the dominant narratives of gender rela-
tionships, deviating from the statewill of gender equality
(Wu, 2009).
2.2. Transformation of Socioeconomic and Demographic
Structure
Structural change of the Chinese society began in the
1950s, but the foundation of industrialization was very
weak. Until 1978, China was still an agricultural country.
Since then, however, it has experienced a dramatic struc-
tural transformation, moving from a closed regime to an
open country, from a planned economy to amarket econ-
omy, from an agricultural society to an industrialized and
urbanized society, from high levels of illiteracy, especially
among women, to universal education, and from many
children to one or two children in each family (Yang &
He, 2014). Changes in these structural forces jointly gen-
erated a new round of shocks, from bottom-up, to tradi-
tional gender norms, both positive and negative.
On the positive side, the most important structural
change with respect to gender equality is the enhanced
level of education, addressed in another article in this
volume. Simply speaking, the implementation of the
Compulsory Education Law and the expansion of col-
lege education have benefited women more than men.
Female illiteracy among those aged 15 and above was
over 90% in 1949 but reduced to 7.3% in 2017; with re-
gard to college enrollment, women accounted for less
than 20% in 1949, but 52.5% in 2017 (ACWF, 2019). The
convergence of education between the two sexes and
the higher proportion of college education of women
than men among post-1990-born birth cohort will have
endowed women with better formal human capital. This
enables women to better participate and compete with
men in the public arena and has also changed their pref-
erences towards work and family, which in turn allows
them to become more independent, autonomous and
self-reliant. Consequently, a more equal gender relation-
ship could be cultivated.
Meanwhile, the influx of foreign capital and the de-
velopment of manufacturing industry since 1978 have
speeded the pace of industrialization and urbanization.
Geographic mobility has been spurred since the early
1980s by the desire to pursue a better life and by re-
laxation of the household (hukou) registration system.
The number of rural-to-urban migrants increased from
6.57 million in 1982 to 245 million in 2017, contribut-
ing greatly to the rapid growth of urbanization, which
was 10.6% in the early 1950s, 20% in 1978 and 59.6%
in 2018 (The Central People’s Government of the PRC,
2019). Large-scale migration and urbanization have also
facilitated the shift in economic structure from agricul-
ture to industry, and from industry to service sectors. In
1952, the share of agriculture in GDP was 50.5%, and
agriculture absorbed 83.5% of the employed population.
In 2018, however, the share in GDP accounted for by
agriculture, industry and service sector was 7.2, 40.7
and 52.2% while the corresponding proportions of em-
ployment were 26.1, 27.6 and 46.3% respectively. What
these numbers simultaneously hint at and conceal are a
growth in opportunities for women to pursue a career
outside the home and away from the land.
The implementation of the restrictive fertility pol-
icy, initiated in 1980 and ended in 2015, also played a
role in reshaping gender relationships. Whereas in 1953,
families tended to have six children, this number fell to
2.7 in 1979 (Yang, 2017) and 1.6 in 2018 (UNDP, 2019).
While acknowledging the controversy surrounding this
policy and the complexity of determining its overall ef-
fect, the rapidly decreasing fertility has had profound im-
plications for gender equality. By reducing the number of
children and thereby further emancipating women from
childbearing and childrearing, it has enabled women to
devote more time to work, pay more attention to self-
improvement and to pursue their own life goals (Zhu &
Li, 1997).
However, since China’s process of modernization is
compressed and its modernity is incomplete (Chang,
2014), the political efforts at promoting gender equality
may also be compromised. During the process of mar-
ketization, traditional gender roles have revived and to
some extent been further strengthened (Gu, 2013), in-
creasing women’s vulnerability in the workplace (Song,
2011). The emphasis on replacing the planned economy
by the market economy and the subsequent reform of
state-owned enterprises was to maximize productivity,
and women were regarded as being less productive and
more expensive due to their role of motherhood (Du &
Dong, 2013; Yang ,2019; Zhang & Hannum, 2015). As
a result, women were laid-off in disproportionate num-
bers, and almost all public childcare facilities were closed
(Yang, 2018). These changes frustrated political and le-
gal efforts to promote gender equality and undermined
the benefits of higher human capital and increased eco-
nomic opportunities, causing China’s gender revolution,
as in some countries in the West, to stall (England, 2010;
Hochschild, 1989).
Simultaneously, themassmedia, catering tomass cul-
ture and the market economy with reality shows, adver-
tisements and other print media, has served to exagger-
ate differences betweenmen andwomen in terms of per-
sonality, appearance, capacity, division of labor and fam-
ily roles. In the nameof ‘modernity’ and ‘modern fashion’
(Gu, 2013; Liu & Zhang, 2013), the traditional image of
women and female roles is praised and male supremacy
maintained and highlighted.
Also, there is a ‘spillover effect’ of the disadvantage of
women in public and private spaces. In China, there was
historically a clear gender boundary in the division of la-
bor (Stockman, Bonney, & Sheng, 1995). Chinese women
do considerably more housework than their husbands
(Yang & Li, 2014), indicating that the strong socialist ide-
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ology of gender equality in work has not successfully pro-
moted normative ideas regarding equality in the division
of housework. The lingering of these traditional gender
roles has a direct negative effect on women’s wage in-
come (Qing, 2019)whichmaypartly explainwhywomen’s
strong attachment to the labor force has not correspond-
ingly altered the balance of power in the household.
Given these institutional and structural shifts and
prior research, we may expect both progress and stag-
nancy or even retrogression in gender relationships,
more so in the era of market-oriented reform than in the
period of a planned economy.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
To provide an overview of gender equality in China, this
article draws on macro data and, when available, sur-
vey data to compare men and women’s performance in
economic and political areas. Macro data mainly include:
data from statistics yearbooks issued by the National
Statistical Bureau (NSB); aggregated data from the 1982,
1990, 2000 and 2010 population censuses, and the 1995,
2005 and 2015 One Percent Population Survey, also
known as the Mini-census, conducted at the midpoint
between two censuses; and data issued by international
organizations. Existing literature is also drawn on to help
interpret the statistical evidence.
Since various sources of data are collected for differ-
ent purposes, they may be inconsistent and not entirely
compatible with each other. However, these inconsisten-
cies should not introduce bias or pose serious problems
since, if the data are over—or under-reported, they tend
to be so for bothmales and females and hence not affect
the relativities. Moreover, when more than one source
is available, we use that which is generally regarded by
scholars to be more reliable.
3.2. Analytical Approaches and Strategy
While this article does not employ sophisticated statis-
tic methods, it does employ a comparative and historical
perspective in exploring the patterns of gender equality
in the workplace. Across various cultures and societies,
the potential tensions of gender relationships can be re-
duced to two factors of demography and social mobility:
the level of inequality itself and the processes determin-
ing the locations of men and women in the social hierar-
chy. This article focuses on the former, comparing men
and women’s access to resources, opportunities and out-
comes in the labor market and political arena. Such a
comparison serves two purposes: to provide an overall
picture of gender equality and to lay down a foundation
for a conceptual framework to explain continuing gender
equality in China.While it would be desirable to compare
gender dynamics between rural and urban areas, or es-
pecially to focus on urban areas, given tremendous dis-
parity in rural and urban development in China, this is
prevented by lack of data.
Two caveats should be noted. First, this article re-
ports only those indicators of gender equality that are
most appropriate in the Chinese context given data avail-
ability. Secondly, the definition of gender equality is in-
evitably somewhat fuzzy since absolute equality may be
neither appropriate nor attainable. Therefore, gender in-
equality is taken to be a relative concept and measured
as difference, rather than in terms of discrimination.
4. Labor Force Participation: Progress and Challenges
From a 70-year perspective, prominent improvements
are clearly evident in the relative position of women, but
since the early 1990s, the onset ofmarketization,women
have faced more challenges in the workplace.
4.1. Labor Force Participation
A comparison of the labor force participation rate for
men and women aged 15 to 64 is an important indica-
tor of gender equality. In most societies, women account
for over one-third of the total labor force, and there is a
positive linkage between gender equality and economic
growth (Khayria & Feki, 2015; Lewis, 2011; Pagés & Piras,
2010). In addition,women in the industrializedworld con-
tribute an average of about 50% to national production
through non-remunerated work while those in the devel-
oping world contribute between 60 and 65% (Meleis &
Lindgren, 2002). In China, women contribute about 41%
to GDP, higher than in most other countries or regions
(Statista, 2020), without considering unpaid work.
Women’s high contribution to GDP is linked to their
high rate of employment, which was just 7.5% in 1949
but rose to 32.9% by 1978, one of the highest in the
world. During Mao’s era, women labored shoulder-to-
shoulder withmen, which putmanywomen on the same
level as men for the first time ever in China (Vanham,
2018). In the early years of socioeconomic reform, fe-
male employment rate kept rising; it was over 70% in
2000, about 10 percentage points higher than that of the
world average (Bao, 2004). Whereas only about two hun-
dred thousand women were employed in 1949, by 2017
the absolute size of the female labor force was 340 mil-
lion (ACWF, 2019). However, female labor participation
rate has declined in recent years. Figure 1 depicts the
changing trajectory of labor force participation rate for
men and women from 1990 to 2017, showing a mono-
tonic decline for both sexes, but faster for women than
for men. By 2017 the participation rate for women was
14 percentage points lower than men.
The decline of labor force participation since the
early 1990s might be related to longer years of edu-
cation for the general population who enter the labor
market at much older ages, and the reclassification of
‘work’—somepeoplemay conduct business at home and
consequently are not included as ‘working’ (Liu, 2007).
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Figure 1. Labor force participation rate by gender: China 1990–2017. Labor force participation rate, male (percentage of
male population ages 15+; modeled ILO estimate). Source: The World Bank (n.d.).
More importantly, however, was the differential layoff of
women by employers in the market reform (Song, 2011).
4.2. Occupational Prestige
The distribution of occupations between men and
women has changed over time with the proportion of
women occupying the highest prestige jobs, as the heads
of government, party organizations, state-owned enter-
prises, and scholastic institutions, increasing by 14 per-
centage points, from 10.4% to 24.9% between 1982 and
2015 (see Table 1).
Similarly, the proportion of women employed as
professionals has increased from 38.3% to 51.6%.
Table 1. Occupations by gender: China 1982–2015 (in percentage).
Leader of Production and
government, transportation
party equipment
organization, Commercial Agriculture operators
enterprises, Office service or related and related
and institutions Professionals workers persons persons personnel Other Total
1982
F 10.4 38.3 24.5 47.5 46.8 35.4 41.7 43.7
M 89.6 61.7 75.5 48.9 53.2 64.6 58.3 56.3
1990
F 11.5 45.3 25.7 51.1 47.9 35.7 42.5 45.0
M 88.5 54.7 74.3 50.0 52.1 64.3 57.5 55.0
2000
F 16.8 51.7 30.3 50.0 48.5 33.4 36.2 45.3
M 83.2 48.3 69.7 50.0 51.5 66.6 63.8 54.7
2005
F 21.7 49.4 31.8 48.9 49.7 32.5 34.9 45.4
M 78.3 50.6 68.2 51.1 50.3 67.5 65.1 54.6
2010
F 25.1 51.1 33.0 51.7 49.2 31.6 37.5 44.7
M 74.9 48.9 67.0 48.3 50.8 68.4 62.5 55.3
2015
F 24.9 51.6 36.2 43.4 48.6 31.0 34.4 42.6
M 75.1 48.4 63.8 56.6 51.4 69.0 65.6 57.4
Note:M stands forMale, F stands for Female. Sources: Data from1982–2000 fromNSB (2003, Table 4–8), data from2005 fromNSB (2007,
Table 5–3), data from 2010 from NSB (2012, Table 3–3), data from 2015 from NSB (2016a, Table 5-4).
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Figure 2. Percentage of women employed in state-owned enterprises: China 1994–2015. Source: Calculated from NSB
(2016b, Tables 1–17 and 1–23).
Conversely, the proportion of women in relatively lower
status jobs, e.g., commercial service industry, decreased
from 47.5% in 1982 to 43.4% in 2015, and the propor-
tion of women as production and transportation equip-
ment operators and related personnel decreased from
35.4% to 31.0% over the same period. State-owned en-
terprises remain highly privileged and prestigious even
after China’s economic reform. The proportion of female
employees in this sector has increased notably since
1994 (Figure 2), while those employed in the sector
as professional and technical personnel increased even
more from 39.1% in 1982 to 48.6% in 2017 (ACWF, 2019).
Having acknowledged the substantial progress of
gender equality, however, we should also recognize that
the gender gap remains salient in higher prestigious occu-
pations. As shown in Table 1, only a quarter of the heads
of government, party organizations, state-owned enter-
prises and scholastic institutions are women. The rea-
sons for the remaining inequality are inevitably complex,
a combination of demand and supply side factors both
mediated by persistence of traditional gender norms, to
be described in other articles in this issue.
4.3. Wage Income
Bases on the analysis of Cotter, DeFiore, Hermsen,
Marsteller Kowalewski, and Vanneman (1997), in the
USA it would be expected that the improved work oppor-
tunity and enhanced occupational prestige for women
will have led to an increase in women’s wages and a re-
duction in the gender wage gap. For a long period in the
second half of the 20th century, the ratio of women to
men’s income in China was more favorable than in most
other countries (Liu, Meng, & Zhang, 2000), with women
in the same positions as men tending to receive equal
pay (particularly in state-owned organizations). However,
this favorable situation disappeared in the reform era.
Data from the China Women Social Status Survey shows
that women’s income rose substantially from 1086 Yuan
in 1990 to 11987 Yuan in 2010 (see Figure 3). However,
as Figure 3 also illustrates, while the wage income of
the two sexes has grown monotonically over time, the
pay gap has widened. Corresponding to relatively low oc-
cupational status jobs, women have experienced slower
wage income growth than men.
Figure 3.Wage income by gender: China 1990–2010.
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 23–35 28
The increasing gender wage gap is not unique to
China. According to WEF (2019) report, while gender
equality has made progress over time, the gender ratio
in income has retreated from 58.1% in 2018 to 57.8%
in 2019 globally, and it is expected to take 257 years to
close the gender gap, longer than estimates in previous
WEF reports. In context with more equal gender ideol-
ogy, the gap is narrower, but even in the most equal
and developed countries or regions in the world, women
earn only 90% that of men; controlling for the potentially
confounding effect of education, work experience and
other factors on income does not make the gap go away
(Bowlus, 1997).
Figure 4 shows the ratio of female tomalemonthly in-
come in urban areas between 1978 and 2015. While the
ratio fluctuated, women consistently earned less than
men throughout the entire period; and while the gap
was gradually closing prior to 1988, it subsequently con-
tinued to widen until a slight rebound in 2015. In 1978,
women’s income was 79% that of men, rose to 84% in
1988, dropping thereafter to 63% in 2014. In the transi-
tion from a socialist to market economy, the emerging
market sectors tended to favor men over women (Shu
& Bian, 2003), while the educational enhancement of
women does not seem to have translated to a reduced
gender wage gap (Ji et al., 2017).
5. Political Presentation: Progress and Stagnancy
Political participation is another, or even a more impor-
tant, indicator of gender equality, and a channel through
which to promote other aspects of gender equality. Since
the establishment of New China, great importance has
been attached to guaranteeing equal political rights be-
tween women and men. Women’s rights of suffrage, be-
ing elected and the management of state affairs have
been legally guaranteed since the early 1950s under the
socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics.
Women have been provided new opportunities for par-
ticipating in politics, and the level of their participation
in state governance and social affairs at the local level
has generally improved but with some exceptions.
As mentioned above, the Constitution of the PRC
specifically guarantees women’s equal rights with men
in political life and protects the rights and interests of
women in training and selecting cadres. Under this over-
arching framework, a number of laws, legislations or
regulations related to ensure women’s political rights
are stipulated, including the Law of the PRC on the
Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (1992).
Currently, the China National Program for Women’s
Development (2011–2020) covers seven areas, includ-
ing economic and political participation. Additionally,
China has signed many international conventions aimed
at addressing gender inequality, the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Womenwhich China ratified in 1980 (Hearle & Hu, 2019),
for example.
In 1990, the National Working Committee on
Children and Women under the State Council was
founded, which is the key body or political organiza-
tion mandated to “organise, coordinate, guide, super-
vise and urge departments concerned in promoting gen-
der equality and women’s development” (State Council
Information Office, 2015). Also, the ACWF, established
in 1949, has long been the major organ that aims to
promote women’s rights and gender equality at all lev-
els. While it does not have the rights to make policies
or regulations, it has the rights to push agendas, and
propose changes to existing policies and opposition to
policy proposals (Hearle & Hu, 2019).
5.1. Political Participation at the Top Level
Since 1949, China’s communist regime has showed
great support for gender equality, and women’s so-
Figure 4. Ratio of women’s income to men’s income: China 1978–2015. Due to different sources of data, the gender wage
gap differs. Sources: Data from 2008–2015 fromWEF (2019); other data compiled by the author.
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cial and political status has in many aspects improved,
although great variation exists. Membership of the
Chinese Communist Party is the fundamental form of
political participation, and being a member of the rul-
ing party (and other democratic parties) is the first step
and prerequisite for getting promoted in the workplace
(namely in government agencies and state-owned enter-
prises), for further political participation, and the most
effective way of directly partaking in politics. Hence,
women’s share in the ruling party is a good indicator
of the level and extent of their political involvement,
and thus of the degree of gender equality. In 2018, fe-
male party members accounted for 27.2% of total mem-
bers, a 16.7 percentage point increase compared to 1956
(ACWF, 2019). The increase of female party members of
the Communist Party of China and other democratic par-
ties has also led to a higher participation rate of women
in the NPC, the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China (CCCPC), and the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top level andmost
influential political participation.
The CCCPC is the core power organ or the most pow-
erful political organization of China. It holds a national
congress every five years, leads the work of the whole
party and decides the appointment and removal of per-
sonnel at the national level. The membership in CCCPC
is an important means of giving women voice and pro-
moting gender quality. As Figure 5 shows, the absolute
number of femalemembers in the CCCPC increased from
170 in 1956 to 378 in 2017; while the proportion fluctu-
ates over time, it increased from 4.7% in 1956 to 7.94%
in 2017 albeit with notable fluctuations.
The share of female representatives of the NPC has
also grown noticeably. The NPC is an important platform
for achieving the goal of sovereignty belonging to the
people and being a deputy on it allows women to effec-
tively engage in politics. Deputies gather once a year to
discuss andmake decisions on important public affairs. At
the first NPC in 1954, there were 147 female deputies, ac-
counting for 12% of the total (see Figure 6). By the fourth
session held in 1975, the number of female deputies had
risen to 653, accounting for 22.6%, a figure that has re-
mained largely unchanged in subsequent sessions. In the
13th NPC held in 2018, there were 551 female deputies,
accounting for 24.9% of all deputies, double the percent-
age in 1954. Figure 6 also shows the proportion of female
deputies in CPPCC. While fluctuating, the proportion of
women has increased over time, from 6.1% in 1954 to
20.4% in 2018, a 14.3 percentage point increase during
this time span. Indeed, many women’s political participa-
tion is realized through the channel of the CPPCC.
The increase of the absolute number and relative
share of female deputies of the CCCPC, the NPC and the
CPPCC points to the increasing engagement of women
at a national level and, in each province, the proportion
of women in these organizations has also increased over
time. Of course, we need to first ask where the power
lies in the Chinese political system if we want to assess
Chinese women’s participation in politics. While the NPC
might not be the best benchmark to evaluate women’s
political participation, it offers them exposure to politi-
cal opportunities and recognition by the general popula-
tion. It is a symbol of progress compared to the situation
70 years ago. Of course, the progress of gender equality
in political area is not as fast as we would expect.
5.2. Political Participation at the Local Level
As the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party at-
tached great importance to the training and selection
of female cadres and the development of female party
members at the local level, and all reports of party con-
gresses since 1990 have clearly demanded attention to
be paid to these issues. The report of the Nineteenth
Figure 5. The number and percent of female member in the CCCPC: China 1956–2017. Sources: NSB (2012, Table 7–1) and
“List of members of the 19th Central Committee” (2017) for the 2017 data.
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Figure 6. Percentage of female deputy in the NPC and CPPCC: China 1954–2018. Sources: “The proportion of women in
CPPCC and NPC has reached a new high” (2018) and NSB (2012, Tables 7–1 and 7–2) for the 2013 and 2018 data.
National Congress of the CCCPC in 2018 emphasized
that the work of training and selecting female cadres,
ethnic minority cadres and non-Party cadres should be
well coordinated.
Consequently, the number of female cadres in Party
and government organs increased from 422,000 in 1978
to 1,906,000 in 2017, accounting for 26.5% of the total
numbers of cadres today. In 2017, women also consti-
tuted 52.4% of new civil servants recruited by the central
government and its directly affiliated institutions, and
44% of persons recruited by local governments. In 2018,
the proportion of women in leading bodies of public in-
stitutions nationwide was 22.2%, 1.6 percentage points
higher than that in 2015 (ACWF, 2019).
However, the rising share of women in these top or-
gans of state and local levels should not disguise the
underrepresentation of women in the policymaking pro-
cess. Women comprise less than 30% of members of
the ruling party, and the number of female deputies
on the CCCPC, the NPC and the CPPCC remains very
low. In certain years, the proportion of female deputies
and members has actually fallen. In 2003, for example,
women accounted for only 20.2% of the 10th NPC mem-
bership, 1.57 percentage points lower than that of the
9th congress.More importantly, not only aremany fewer
women than men appointed to the Political Bureau of
the CCCPC, but also none of current seven members of
the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, themost
powerful institution, is female. Although women appear
to have equal rights to vote and stand for election, they
are still a minority in the formal political system. At the
lowest level of government, arguably the level most no-
ticeable in people’s lives, women accounted for only
5.8% of village directors (including vice directors) and
5.4% of female village Party secretaries (including vice
secretaries) according to the third China Women Social
Status Survey conducted in 2010 (Song & Zhen, 2013).
So, it is clear that there is a disjuncture between pol-
icy rhetoric and women’s presentation in the political
arena. Indeed, theWEF reports in recent years show that
China’s gender equality has deteriorated, and one of the
two most important indicators responsible for the low-
ering ranking is women’s low representation in politics.
Political position, arguably the most valuable resource
since it generates other kinds of resources, has been his-
torically and, to a less extent, currently, controlled and
possessed by men. Women used to be taught not to ac-
cess it and had no access to it. While all parties in China
today allegedly welcome female members, women con-
tinue to have limited access and opportunity to both
higher and lower levels of political positions. Even when
opportunities present, womenmay not bewilling or able
to take them due to the ‘spillover effect’ of heavy domes-
tic duties that continue to be borne by women since gen-
der stereotypes prioritizing women’s reproductive roles
as dutiful wives over their productive role (Hearle & Hu,
2019) remains pervasive in China.
6. Summary, Discussion and Reflection
Both macro and micro data paint a picture of progress
and challenges in gender relationships. Generally speak-
ing, Chinese women have moved forward over the last
70 years, making salient progress in the public domain
with the gender relationship becoming more equal eco-
nomically and politically. This is apparent in the rel-
atively high rate of female labor force participation,
in the influx of women into more prestigious occupa-
tions, in substantially increased wage income, and in the
growth in political representation in the institutions of
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government, if we examine gender relationship from a
70-year perspective.
However, significant gender gaps have also occurred
in the workplace in the past 70 years, and further
widened in the reform era. While both men and women
have experienced a reduction in employment rate,
women’s decline is more pronounced than for men. The
varieties of occupations open to women is limited, partic-
ularly those with higher prestige. While women’s wage
income has risen over time, men’s income has increased
much faster. Their share in top political positions is only
one-fifth to one-fourth that of men, and less than one-
third in lower level of political positions. Consequently,
the gender gap in theworkplace is persisting, and in some
indicators, widening. In other words, although most of
the indicators examined here have been going in the
right direction, marketization has had an adverse impact,
especially regarding employment. We have witnessed
progress in the political arena, but it is not a very good
picture overall—not only are women missing at the ‘top,’
but they are also missing at the ‘bottom’ (in the villages).
The falling employment rates, the rise of wage in-
come, and the fluctuating rate of political participation
may mirror period effects resulting from industrializa-
tion, modernization and marketization, while the exist-
ing and enlarged gender gap found in this article may
reflect the continuation of traditional sex roles rooted
in the patriarchal system resurrected and strengthened
by marketization. It is clear that women substantially en-
hanced human capital, available time and personal space
due to the lower birth rate, and improved capacity in
various ways neither bring them corresponding occupa-
tional prestige or income, nor political positions. The gen-
eral pattern is that a more equal gender relationship is
found between men and women when resources (e.g.,
education and health) are relatively adequate, particu-
larly when the resources can be effectively controlled or
distributed by government, but that a female disadvan-
tage emergeswhen resources are scarce, e.g., more pres-
tigious occupations, higher wage and political positions.
Indeed, although during the past 70 years China has
consistently advocated and practiced gender equality in
a top-down pattern by means of legislation and public
policies, these regulations have tended to be guidelines.
During the period with a planned economy it proved
possible to realize the political desire for greater gen-
der equality through the exercise of authoritarian state
power. Since such norms were not internalized by the
general population in Mao’s era, the ideology of gender
equality has givenway to profit-seeking behaviors during
the era of marketization. Moreover, when facing employ-
ment pressure in the early stage of market reform, schol-
ars, social activists and even government officials repeat-
edly proposed that women should go home to take care
of the family and leavemarket jobs tomen. This points to
a departure from, indeed even a corruption of, the ide-
ology of gender equality which is now seen to be con-
ditional on the premise of not harming the interests of
men. The outside world must still belong to men, and it
could also belong to women today, depending on the ac-
ceptance of men. This male-centered conditionality has
rendered the so-called ‘equal division’ between the two
sexes to bemore of a slogan or simply a politically correct
discourse than a reality.
Limited supply of publicly funded childcare service
for children under the age of three is also a major de-
terrent to women’s performance in the labor market.
With market-oriented reform, this service has almost to-
tally disappeared (Yang, 2018). While private ‘childcare’
services have flourished in recent decades, it is either
too expensive to be affordable to working class families,
or does not provide daily-based childcare service—they
mostly only provide early child education or develop-
ment courses on weekends and holidays. Women have
to work a “second shift” (Hochschild, 1989), and shoul-
der the double burden of paid and unpaid domesticwork.
This renders women’s daily total work hoursmuch longer
than men’s, creating greater tension between work and
family responsibilities. Consequently, they may either
have to exit the labor market for reason of family re-
sponsibilities or be unable to devote as much time to
work as men, which negatively affects their job perfor-
mance. Moreover, given the universal two-child policy
regime, employers may fear that women will take ma-
ternity leave twice, exacerbating discrimination toward
women in the workplace (Kang & Lv, 2016).
Hence, further improvements of gender equality can-
not simply rely on women’s subjective initiatives; efforts
at all levels and by all stakeholders are important in pro-
moting gender equality in the workplace in China. For
example, the government should take more concrete
steps to change traditional gender roles in both the pri-
vate and public arenas and promote equally paid pa-
ternity and maternity leave. Also, more concerted ef-
forts should be made to encourage enterprises to adopt
family-friendly work arrangements, and reduce discrim-
ination towards women in terms of recruitment, pro-
motion, and in other aspects of employment practice.
Moreover, safe public childcare services for children un-
der the age of three should be revived in order to alle-
viate childrearing penalties and work-family conflicts, es-
pecially for the mother, in addition to encouraging the
market to provide childcare services to meet the diverse
needs of families. Through these efforts, more equal gen-
der norms and practices in the workplace could be real-
ized, which in turnwould stimulatewomen’s work poten-
tial and generate a ‘gender-equality dividend.’ This will
not only be a powerful engine for a new round of eco-
nomic growth, but also a driving force for an inclusive
and sustainable development, when the current ‘demo-
graphic dividend’ disappears.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported by the China National Natural
Science Foundation (Project No. 71673287), and the
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 23–35 32
Major Project of National Social Science Foundation of
China (Project No. 17ZDA122). I would like to thank
Dr. Robert Walker and Jane Millar for their insightful
suggestions and careful editing of the article. I would
also like to thank reviewers for their valuable comments.
Further, I would like to thank Susu Wang for compiling
some data used in this article.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
All China Women’s Federation. (2019). White book of
equal development and sharing: The development
and progress of women’s cause in the past 70 years
in New China. Central People’s Government of the
PRC. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/
2019-09/19/content_5431327.htm
Bao, J. H. (2004). The history, current situation and
prospect of female labor force participation. Labor &
Social Security World, 3, 28–29.
Bowlus, A. J. A. (1997). Search interpretation of male-
female wage differentials. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 15(4), 625–657.
Chang, K. S. (2014). Individualization without individual-
ism: Compressed modernity and obfuscated family
crisis in East Asia: Transformation of the intimate and
the public in Asian modernity. Leiden: Brill.
Cotter, D. A., DeFiore, J., Hermsen, J. M., Marsteller
Kowalewski, B., & Vanneman, R. (1997). All women
benefit: The macro-Level effect of occupational inte-
gration on gender earnings equality. American Socio-
logical Review, 62(5), 714–734.
Du, F., & Dong, X. Y. (2013). Women’s employment
and childcare choices in urban China during the eco-
nomic transition. Economic Development and Cul-
tural Change, 62(1), 131–155.
England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and
stalled. Gender and Society, 24(2), 149–166.
Gu, H. (2013). The state, market and recurrence of tradi-
tional social gender concept. Academia, 6,104–114.
Hearle, C., & Hu, D. F. (2019). China country brief: On gen-
der equality and women’s economic empowerment.
London: UKAid/WOW.
Hochschild, A. R. (1989). The second shift: Working par-
ents and the revolution at home. New York, NY: Avon
Books.
Ji, Y., Wu, X. G., Sun, S., & Guo, G. Y. (2017). Unequal care,
unequal work: Toward a more comprehensive under-
standing of gender inequality in post-reform urban
China. Sex Roles, 77(11/12), 765–778.
Jiang, Y. P. (2012). Duel construction of nation and family
and women’s gender role in China’s “planned econ-
omy” period. Journal of ShandongWomen College, 1,
1–6.
Jin, Y. H. (2006). Rethinking of iron girls: Gender and la-
bor in cultural revolution in China. Sociological Study,
1, 169–196.
Kang, R., & Lv, X. J. (2016). A summary of the debate
on the relationship between the universal two-child-
policy, childbearing intention and female employ-
ment. Theory Monthly, 12, 155–161.
Khayria, K., & Feki, R. (2015). Gender inequality
and economic development. Business and Eco-
nomics Journal, 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2151-
6219.1000180
Lewis, K. (2011). The gender dividend: A business
case for gender equality. UN Women. Retrieved
from http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/
publications/2011/12/the-gender-dividend-a-
business-case-for-gender-equality
Li, C. L. (2016). “Male disadvantage,” “left-over women”
and difficulty in the job market of female college
students: Challenges from the gender reversal in
education. Journal of Chinese Women’s Studies, 2,
33–39.
Li, X. J. (1997). What words do we use to think about
women, and who makes words and endows them
with meaning? Zhejiang Academic Journal, 4, 81–91.
List of members of the 19th Central Committee, alter-
nate members and members of the Central Commis-
sion for discipline inspection. (2017, October 23). Xin-
huanet. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/
politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/24/c_1121848969.htm
Liu, A. Y. (2018). Institution, opportunity structure and
gender attitude: How labor participation of urban
married women being possible? Journal of Chinese
Women’s Studies, 6, 15–30.
Liu, Q. (2007). Several issues on improving employment
statistics. Journal of Harbin Party School, 2, 43–44.
Liu, L. Q., & Zhang, J. J. (2013). “Leftover women” and
banquet: The phenomenon of “leftover women” in
gender perspective and media communication strat-
egy. Journal of Chinese Women Studies, 5, 76–82.
Liu, P. W., Meng, X., & Zhang, J. (2000). Sectoral gen-
der wage differentials and discrimination in the tran-
sitional Chinese economy. Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, 13(2), 331–352.
Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu had a good swim
in Ming Tomb reservoir. (1965). Renmin News-
paper. Retrieved from http://data.people.com.cn/
rmrb/19650527/1
Maurer-Fazio, M., Rawski, T. G., & Zhang, R. W. (1999).
Inequality in the rewards for holding up half the sky:
Gender wage gaps in China’s urban labor market,
1988–1994. The China Journal, 41, 55–88.
Meleis, A. I., & Lindgren, T. G. (2002). Menwork from sun
to sun, but women’s work is never done: Insights on
research and policy. Health Care for Women Interna-
tional, 23, 742–753.
National Statistical Bureau. (2003). Men and women
in Chinese society: Facts and figures. Beijing: China
Statistics Press.
National Statistical Bureau. (2007). National one percent
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 23–35 33
population survey of 2005 in China. Beijing: China
Statistics Press.
National Statistical Bureau. (2012). Men and women
in Chinese society: Facts and figures. Beijing: China
Statistics Press.
National Statistical Bureau. (2016a). The 2015 na-
tional one percent population survey data. Yearbook
China. Retrieved from https://www.yearbookchina.
com/navibooklist-N2017060068-2.html
National Statistical Bureau. (2016b). China population
and employment statistics yearbook. Beijing: China
Statistics Press.
Pagés, C., & Piras, C. (2010). The gender dividend: Cap-
italizing on women’s work. Washington, DC: I-ADB
Publications.
Qing, S. S. (2019). Social and cultural roots of gender in-
come gap in China: An empirical analysis based on
gender roles. Sociological Studies, 1, 106–131.
Shi, F. L. (2009). Gender and the current status, prob-
lems and reason of women’s political participation in
China.Work Union Forum, 15(2), 23–25.
Shu, X., & Bian, Y. (2003). Market transition and gender
gap in earnings in urban China. Social Forces, 81(4),
1107–1145.
Song, S. P. (2011). “Home” or “be Homed”? “Women’s
going home” in the process of marketization and the
transformation of ideology in Chinese society. Jour-
nal of Chinese Women Studies, 4, 5–12.
Song, X., & Zhen, G. (2013). An investigation of Chi-
nese women’s social status. Beijing: Chinese Women
Press.
State Council Information Office. (2015). Gender equal-
ity and women’s development in China. State
Council Information Office. Retrieved from http://
www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2015/Document/
1449894/1449894.htm
Statista. (2020). Percentage of GDP contributed by
female workers, as of 2015, by region. Statista.
Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/
523838/women-share-of-gdp-region
Stockman, N., Bonney, N., & Sheng, X.W. (1995).Women’s
work in East andWest: The dual burdenof employment
and family life. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
The Central People’s Government of the PRC. (2005).
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Bei-
jing: The Central People’s Government of the PRC. Re-
trieved from http://www.gov.cn/govweb/test/2005-
06/14/content_6310.htm
The Central People’s Government of the PRC. (2019). A
report released by the National Bureau of Statistics
shows that China’s urbanization rate has increased
significantly in 70 years. Central People’s Govern-
ment of the PRC. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/
shuju/2019-08/16/content_5421576.htm
The proportion of women in CPPCC and NPC has reached
a new high. (2018, February 24). Xinhua News.
The World Bank. (n.d.). Labor force participation rate,
male (% of male population ages 15+)—China. The
World Bank. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.MA.ZS?locations=CN
UNDP. (2019). United Nations: World population data
outlook 2019. 199IT. Retrieved from http://www.
199it.com/archives/896468.html
Vanham, P. (2018, April 12). Women in China contribute
more to GDP than in the US. Viewing them as
‘leftover’ is problematic. We Forum. Retrieved
from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/
women-in-china-contribute-more-to-gdp-than-in-
the-us-viewing-them-as-leftover-is-problematic
World Economic Forum. (2019). Global gender gap
report 2018.World Economic Forum. Retrieved from
http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-
report-2018
Wu, X. Y. (2009). Change of gender discourse in the
context of marketization. Social Science in China, 2,
163–176.
Xi, J. (2015, September 28). Promote women’s all-round
development in order to build and share a better
world: Speech at the Global Women’s Summit. Xin-
hua News. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.
com/politics/2015-09/28/c_128272780.htm
Yan, J. J. (2018). Political participation of women in China
in the perspective of gender (Unpublished Master
dissertation). Chunyu Dong, Liaoning Normal Univer-
sity, Dalian, Liaoning Province.
Yang, J. H. (2010). Gender equality in China revisited: The-
ory and reflections. Journal of Chinese Women Stud-
ies, 6, 5–18.
Yang, J. H. (2017). Fertility policy and family change in
China. Open Times, 3, 12–26.
Yang, J. H. (2018). Supply-side reform and childcare ser-
vice for children under age three. Social Sciences, 9,
89–100.
Yang, J. H. (2019). “Double taxes of gender and mother-
hood” and female labor force participation. Popula-
tion Research, 1, 38–53.
Yang, J. H., & He, Z. H. (2014). Continuity or change:
Family in transitional China. Population Research, 2,
38–53.
Yang, J. H., & Li, H. J. (2014). Continuity or strategy: Gen-
der pattern of division of household work in China
between 1990–2010. Academic Research, 2, 31–41,
54.
Yang, J. H., & Xie, Y. F. (2013). The situation of Chinese
women’s education. In X. H. Jiang, T. Lin, & Y. P.
Jiang (Eds.), In 2008–2013: China’s gender equality
and women’s development report (pp. 42–58). Bei-
jing: China Women Press.
Zhang, Y., & Hannum, E. (2015). Diverging fortunes: The
evolution of gender wage gaps for singles, couples
and parents in China, 1989–2009. Chinese Journal of
Sociology, 1(1), 15–55.
Zhu, C. Z., & Li, S. Z. (1997). The double-edged effect of
the one-child policy and women in China. Xian: Xian
Transportation University Press.
Zuo, J. P. (2005). Women’s liberation and gender equality
in 1950s: Experiences and feelings of urban couples
in China. Society, 1, 182–209.
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 23–35 34
About the Author
Juhua Yang graduated from the Department of Sociology at Brown University and is currently a
Professor of Sociology at Minzu University of China. Her research focuses on social wellbeing and its
articulation with social change. Recently published books include In Search of the Urban Dream in
China (2018), Introduction to Social Demography (2016),Migration and Economic Integration (2013),
Advanced Social Statistics in Stata (2012) and Population Change and Poverty among the Elderly (2011).
She has also published numerous research articles on gender and family.
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 23–35 35
